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 Pursuant to the Court’s Order of November 20, 2018, amici curiae the American 
Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Utah submit this brief to explain why the Court can 
and should issue a rule permitting undocumented immigrants to be admitted as members 
of the Utah State Bar. 
 The Utah Constitution empowers this Court to regulate the practice of law in Utah, 
including bar admission.  It also prohibits any other branch of Utah government from 
regulating the practice of law, both to ensure judicial independence and to protect the 
integrity of judicial proceedings.  This Court is therefore the sole entity that exercises the 
State’s lawmaking authority over bar admission. 
 Federal law allows this Court to exercise its authority in this case.  Federal law 
sets a default rule that undocumented immigrants are ineligible for state “public 
benefit[s],” which includes some “professional license[s].”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), (c).  But 
even assuming a law license qualifies as a “public benefit” under § 1621(c), a “State” can 
make undocumented immigrants eligible for public benefits “through the enactment of a 
State law” that “affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”  Id. § 1621(d).  Section 
1621(d) thus allows the State of Utah to enact a law making undocumented immigrants 
eligible for bar admission.  And this Court is the entity—the only entity—that makes 
such laws in Utah. 
Nothing in § 1621(d) compels a different result.  The United States may argue that 
§ 1621(d) requires States to exercise their lawmaking authority through their legislatures 
only—that a state statute is required to opt out of the prohibition in § 1621(a).  But  
2 
 
§ 1621(d) does not purport to dictate which branch of state government must make this 
decision.  The text describes the process for providing eligibility using the most general 
terms possible—“enact[]” and “law”—without specifying who must do the enacting, or 
what form the law must take.  As multiple dictionaries, judicial usage, and congressional 
usage attest, those terms refer to legal rules of all kinds, not just statutes, and to 
lawmaking entities of all kinds, not just legislatures.  Indeed, when Congress wants to 
specify a particular state actor or type of state law, it regularly makes explicit reference to 
“statutes,” “legislation,” “state legislatures,” and the like.  By omitting those more 
specific words in § 1621(d), and instead using general terms, Congress left it to the States 
to determine which branch of state government regulates which activities.  That makes 
sense, because Congress has no valid interest in how States choose to structure their 
governments, including which branch regulates public benefits. 
 A contrary interpretation—that only the Utah Legislature can enact a law 
providing public benefits—would mark a severe federal intrusion on the internal structure 
of Utah’s government.  The only effect of such a rule would be to dictate which branch of 
Utah’s government exercises the State’s lawmaking authority.  The State would retain its 
authority to admit undocumented immigrants to the bar.  But by requiring action by the 
Utah Legislature, this interpretation of § 1621(d) would override Utah’s decision to 
assign bar admission decisions to the Court, thus forcing the State to distribute its own 
lawmaking authority according to federal instructions. 
 At the very least, that kind of intrusion would require an “unmistakably clear” 
statement in the text of § 1621(d)—a statement that is lacking here.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
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501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quotation  marks omitted).  The best reading of § 1621(d)’s 
text is that the statute is agnostic about which branch of state government provides 
eligibility for public benefits.  But even assuming the text were ambiguous, the 
federalism clear-statement rule would require the Court to choose the less intrusive 
interpretation, the one that preserves the State’s internal allocation of its own authority.  
Nor is there anything in § 1621’s purpose that explains why Congress would have 
preferred one kind of state law over another.  The statute was enacted to regulate public 
benefits, not the balance of power within state governments. 
 Constitutional avoidance requires the same result.  A legislature-only rule would 
contravene the Constitution’s federal structure, which empowers Congress to regulate 
private actors directly, but not to issue orders to state governments.  Such a rule would 
constitute a direct order to the governments of the States, forcing them to assign their 
own lawmaking power to a federally-chosen arm of their governments.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has rejected such federally-imposed allocations of state authority in a 
number of contexts.  And the only other court to consider this constitutional question 
came to the same conclusion.  See In re Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 11-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2015). 
 There being no legal obstacle, this Court should provide that otherwise-eligible 
undocumented immigrants may be admitted to the Utah State Bar.  Immigrants like the 
petitioners are no different than any other barred attorney in Utah.  They have lived in the 
United States for decades, put down roots in Utah, obtained law degrees, and been 
admitted to the bar of another State.  There is no reason to deny them the ability to 
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practice their profession and support their families in their home State.  The Court should 
permit them to receive law licenses. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Can Enact a Law Making Undocumented Immigrants Eligible 
for Bar Admission. 
 
Under federal law, certain undocumented immigrants are, as a default matter, “not 
eligible for any State or local public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), which is defined to 
include a “professional license,” id. § 1621(c).  It is far from clear that law licenses fall 
within § 1621(c)’s definition of public benefits.  See In re Garcia, 58 Cal.4th 440, 456-57 
(2014) (noting uncertainty).  But even if they do, the same statute provides that “[a] State 
may provide” that undocumented immigrants are eligible for “any State or local public 
benefit . . . through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which 
affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”  Id. § 1621(d). 
This Court can enact the law described in § 1621(d).  The Utah Constitution gives 
the Court exclusive authority to make laws governing bar admission for the State of Utah.  
Section 1621(d) does not interfere with that decision, because its text and structure 
impose no requirement about which branch of state government must speak for the State.  
Nor is there any reliable legislative history that explains why Congress would have 
wanted to dictate which branch exercises the State’s authority over public benefits.  Any 
such intrusion would require an unmistakably clear statement, which is nowhere to be 
found in the text of § 1621(d).  And in all events, constitutional avoidance precludes the 
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intrusive version, because a legislature-only rule would violate the States’ fundamental 
prerogative to allocate authority within their own governments. 
A. The Utah Constitution Gives This Court Sole Authority to Regulate Bar 
Admission. 
 
The Utah Constitution assigns this Court authority to regulate bar admission.  See 
Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4 (“The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, 
including admission to practice law . . . .”).  This power is as old as the Court:  “From its 
beginning, this Court has had the inherent power to regulate the practice of law . . . .”  
Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Utah 1993).  Indeed, throughout the 
United States, “the courts have historically regulated admission to the practice of law 
before them.”  Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991); see Hustedt 
v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 30 Cal.3d 329, 336-37 (1981) (en banc) (the same is true 
in “every state”). 
The Court’s authority to decide who can be admitted to the Utah Bar is 
“exclusive,” meaning it cannot be supplemented or displaced by the Legislature.  Injured 
Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 27, 374 P.3d 14 (“Our caselaw 
recognizing this exclusive authority is extensive.”).  The Utah Legislature used to have 
concurrent authority to regulate bar admission, but in 1984, the people of Utah ratified a 
constitutional amendment to remove that power from the Legislature.  Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.  
Vesting sole authority in this Court was “considered essential to . . . maintaining an 
independent judiciary.”  Id. ¶ 23 (quoting Const. Rev. Comm’n, Report to the Governor 
and the 45th Legislature 27 (1984)).  And to further ensure the Court’s independence, the 
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Constitution affirmatively forbids the other branches of Utah government from exercising 
“any functions appertaining to” this Court, including bar admission.  See Utah Const. art. 
V, § 1; State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 25, 233 P.3d 476 (Utah 2010).  Thus, without “any 
exception,” the Utah Constitution does not permit “legislative oversight” of the Court’s 
“authority to govern the practice of law.”  Injured Workers, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 26 (quoting 
Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 25).
1
 
This Court has used its authority to issue a variety of rules to govern the practice 
of law in Utah.  See, e.g., Rule 14-704 (“Qualifications for Admission of Attorney 
Applicants”); Rule 14-718 (“Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants”).  The rule 
requested by the petitioners would be precisely the type of law this Court regularly enacts 
under its article XIII section 4 power.
2
 
B. Section 1621(d) Does Not Restrict Who May Enact the Relevant State 
Law. 
 
1. Section 1621(d)’s Text Permits This Court to Extend Bar Admission to 
Undocumented Immigrants. 
 
Section 1621(d) allows this Court to exercise the authority conferred by the Utah 
Constitution.  The statute provides that “[a] State” can make immigrants eligible for 
public benefits “through the enactment of a State law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).  And the way 
                                                 
1
 There is a Utah statute that regulates immigrants’ eligibility for public benefits in 
general.  See, e.g., Utah Code § 63G-12-401.  But because the Utah Constitution prohibits 
the Legislature from exercising this Court’s powers, that statute cannot be applied to bar 
admission or otherwise constrain this Court’s discretion over who is admitted to the Utah 
Bar. 
2
 If the Court determines that it cannot issue the requested rule, the Utah Legislature may 
be able to enact such a law, because that function would no longer “appertain[] to” this 
Court.  Utah Const. art. V, § 1. 
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the State of Utah enacts laws governing bar admission—the only way—is through this 
Court.  See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 580 (1984) (court acts as “the State itself” 
when it regulates bar admission); see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 
(1977) (same).  Indeed, because the Court exercises Utah’s lawmaking authority over the 
practice of law, the Court “act[s] in a legislative capacity” when it regulates bar 
admission.  Hoover, 466 U.S. at 580, 568.  And it “exercis[es] the State’s entire 
legislative power with respect to regulating the Bar,” because its authority in this realm is 
exclusive.  Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 
719, 734 (1980) (emphasis added) (holding that state supreme court justices had 
legislative immunity when making rules to govern the practice of law). 
The United States may argue that § 1621(d) requires a statute enacted by a state 
legislature, and thus prevents this Court from providing bar eligibility.  But § 1621(d) 
does not specify what form the “law” must take or who must “enact” it.  Multiple aspects 
of its text and context make clear that the law it describes can be enacted by whichever 
branch of state government holds the relevant authority—not just the legislature. 
First, the text’s “ordinary meaning” precludes a legislature-only construction.  
State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 13, 308 P.3d 517 (quotation marks omitted); BP Am. 
Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006) (instructing courts to start with a statute’s 
“ordinary meaning”).  Section 1621(d) uses the most general terms possible to describe 
the process for a State to provide eligibility for benefits: “the enactment of a State law.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).  All dictionaries of which amici are aware agree that the term “law” 
broadly refers to “[t]he set of rules or principles dealing with a specific area.”  Black’s 
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Law Dictionary, 1015 (10th Ed. 2014).  And “enact” simply means “[t]o make into law 
by authoritative act.”  Id. at 643.
3
  Thus, “Congress could not have chosen a more all-
encompassing phrase” to capture the range of laws that different state entities might 
enact—statutes, regulations, court rules, executive orders.  Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
552 U.S. 214, 221 (2008).  That choice makes sense, because States provide a wide set of 
public benefits through a variety of entities. 
Section 1621(d) also avoids any mention of who must “enact[]” the opt-out law.  It 
simply allows “the enactment” of such a law, “without respect to a specific actor.”  Dean 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009).  The text thus demonstrates a clear 
“agnosticism about who does the” enacting.  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  To the extent 
it specifies an actor, it simply refers to “[a] State” as its subject.  And as explained above, 
this Court acts as “the State itself” when it regulates bar admissions.  Hoover, 466 U.S. at 
580. 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, 643 (10th Ed. 2014) (defining “enactment” as “[t]he 
action or process of making into law”); The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 
1544 (1993) (defining “law” as “a rule of conduct imposed by secular authority” or 
“[a]ny of the body of individual rules in force in a State or community”); id. at 812 
(defining “enact” as “establish (a law, legal penalty, etc.); decree (a thing, that)”); The 
American Heritage College Dictionary, 769 (3d Ed. 1997) (defining “law” as “a rule of 
conduct or procedure established by custom, agreement, or authority”); id. at 452 
(defining “enact” as “to make into law”); Oxford Living Dictionary, “Law”, available at  
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/law (defining a “law” as “[a]n individual rule 
as part of a system of law”); id. at “Enact”, available at 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/enact  (defining “enact” as “make . . . law”); 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Law”, available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/law (defining a “law” as “a rule of conduct or action” that is 
“binding or enforced by a controlling authority”); id. at “Enact”, available at 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enact (defining “enact” as “to establish by 
legal and authoritative act”). 
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Section 1621(d)’s “agnosticism” about who enacts the relevant law is confirmed 
by comparing it to other statutes where Congress did specify what kind of state law was 
required to opt out of a default federal prohibition.  For instance, “a State may enact a 
statute” to cancel the default rule preempting certain securities laws.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3a(c) (emphasis added).  It can waive federal tax immunity through “a State statute” only.  
5 U.S.C. § 5517(a)(1) (emphasis added).  And “a State may enact legislation” to alter the 
default distribution of certain federal funds.  31 U.S.C. § 6907(a) (emphasis added).
4
  
These provisions show that Congress is “perfectly capable” of referring to state statutes 
and legislation when it wants to.  Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).  
And it is similarly capable of naming specific state actors when it so intends.  See, e.g., 
49 U.S.C. § 44718(d)(1) (“State aviation agency” can seek to opt out of federal 
prohibition); 42 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(1) (“legislative body”); 42 U.S.C. § 1322 
(“Governor”); 42 U.S.C. § 4021 (“insurance commissioner”).  The fact that it did neither 
in § 1621(d)—and instead used the most general terms available—forecloses any attempt 
to read “law” in § 1621(d) to mean “statute.”  See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 
85, 103 (2007) (“Drawing meaning from silence is particularly inappropriate [where] 
Congress has shown that it knows how to” convey that meaning “in express terms.”). 
Congress did the same thing in the same bill that enacted § 1621, referring to a 
“State statute” and a “State legislature” on multiple occasions.  See Personal 
                                                 
4
 These provisions govern specific areas that are typically regulated by state 
legislatures—taxes, appropriations—and therefore, unlike a reading of § 1621(d) that 
bars this Court from granting the petition, do not necessarily shift any authority between 
different branches of state government.  Section 1621(d), by contrast, applies to a wide 
array of benefits and licenses provided by a broad set of state entities. 
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, §§ 104(k), 395(b)(2), 415(b)(3)(B), 901(a).  In fact, PRWORA speaks 
elsewhere of “laws enacted by the legislature of [a] State,” id. § 395(b)(2) (emphasis 
added), a striking departure from § 1621(d)’s reference to laws enacted simply by “[a] 
State.”  Interpreting § 1621(d) to require legislation would effectively revise it to add the 
exact phrase—“by the legislature”—that Congress included in other provisions but 
omitted in § 1621(d).  “Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion” of statutory language.  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 
(1983).  The Court should not “conclud[e] here that the differing language in the two 
subsections has the same meaning in each.”  Id.; accord Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 
430-31 (2009). 
Indeed, Congress itself regularly uses “law” to refer to legal rules beyond statutes.  
Many statutes explicitly define “[t]he term ‘State law’ [to] include[] all laws, decisions, 
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.”  29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1); 
see id. § 1191(d)(1) (same); 27 U.S.C. § 214(11) (similar); 15 U.S.C. § 6764(10)(A) 
(similar).  Other federal statutes make that definition clear in context, without defining 
the term explicitly.  See, e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 823a(a) (describing “provisions of law” as 
“including” both “statutes and regulations”); 16 U.S.C. § 460l-33(c)(1)(B)(i) (referring to 
“applicable laws (including any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order)”); 18 
U.S.C. § 3600A(d) (referring to “any statute, regulation, court order, or other provision of 
law”).  These statutes rule out any suggestion that Congress automatically means 
“statute” when it says “law.”  Just the opposite. 
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Reading § 1621(d) to require legislative action would likewise run contrary to 
widespread judicial usage.  Courts often describe legal rules as being “enacted by [a] 
Court.”  McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 862 (1994); see, e.g., Pyper v. Bond, 2011 UT 
45, ¶ 14 n.9, 258 P.3d 575 (“[T]he Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted by this 
court . . . .”).  And they frequently describe court-enacted legal rules as “laws.”  For 
instance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are enacted by U.S. Supreme Court, which 
describes them as “federal law” and “the law of the United States.” Société Nationale 
Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987).  Utah courts 
characterize them the same way, as “federal law.”  Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 
2003 UT App. 46, ¶ 9 n.11, 68 P.3d 1008; see also Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n  v. 
Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983). 
In addition to clashing with dictionary definitions, statutory usage, and judicial 
usage, a statute-only reading would not square with “the language as we normally speak 
it.”  Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007).  If a lawyer misappropriates client 
funds, thereby triggering severe penalties, no one would dispute that the person has 
violated state law.  See Utah R. Prof’l Conduct 1.15(a) (requiring attorneys to safeguard 
client funds); Sup. Ct. R. Prof’l Prac. 14-603 (listing permissible sanctions); In re 
Discipline of Lundgren, 2015 UT 58, ¶ 25, 355 P.3d 984 (affirming disbarment).  Nor 
could anyone dispute that this Court had enacted those laws.  And while “enact” and 
“law” may be most frequently used in the context of legislation, they are plainly not 
limited to that context.  As this Court has explained, “the typical reach of [a] statute” does 
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not “define the full breadth of the statute’s scope.”  Graves v. North Eastern Serv., Inc., 
2015 UT 28, ¶ 65, 345 P.3d 619. 
It is therefore clear that § 1621(d) does not dictate which branch of Utah’s 
government must exercise the State’s authority to provide public benefits.  Congress 
chose the most general terms available for describing a legal rule and the process for 
establishing it.  There is no broader phrase it could have used to capture the range of 
benefits that States provide and the range of state actors who provide them.  If Congress 
had wanted to require a statute enacted by a state legislature, all it had to do was use the 
word “statute” or “legislature,” as it has in many other statutes. 
There is accordingly no basis to read § 1621(d) to require a statute enacted by the 
state legislature.  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts not to 
“read[] words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.”  Dean, 556 U.S. at 
572 (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)).  The text alone answers this 
Court’s first question. 
2. The Federalism Clear-Statement Rule Confirms that This Court May Enact 
the Requested Law. 
 
Even assuming arguendo that § 1621(d) was open to multiple interpretations, 
principles of federalism require courts to interpret federal statutes in a way that preserves 
the States’ internal distribution of power.  For a federal statute to alter “the structure of [a 
State’s] government,” Congress “must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in 
the language of the statute.”  Gregory 501 U.S. at 460. (quotation marks omitted).  This 





  And it forecloses a legislature-only view of § 1621(d), because 
that interpretation is not “unmistakably clear” from the text of the statute. 
The federalism clear-statement rule applies here because the intrusive reading of  
§ 1621(d) would “alter[] the State’s governmental structure” by shifting power over bar 
admission from state courts to state legislatures.  City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 
(D.C. Cir. 1999); see Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (applying the 
rule because an interpretation would have altered the “State’s chosen disposition of its 
own power” by shifting power from state legislatures to political subdivisions).  And the 
rule applies with particular force because “the regulation of the activities of the bar is at 
the core of the State’s power.”  Bates, 433 U.S. at 361; Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 
(1979); see Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying Gregory 
to federal laws that affect the practice of law). 
Section 1621(d) cannot satisfy the rule’s high bar, because its text does not 
“plainly and unequivocally” state that only a legislature can enact the relevant law.  
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.  As explained, it makes no mention of legislatures or statutes, 
and it uses the broadest and most general language to describe the process for providing 
benefits.  The federalism rule is therefore dispositive here. 
In fact, § 1621(d) is even less explicit than many of the provisions that have failed 
to satisfy the rule.  In Nixon, for instance, a federal statute provided that States could not 
restrict “any entity” from entering the telecommunications business, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) 
                                                 
5
 See City of Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying the federalism 
clear-statement rule while “assum[ing] arguendo that Congress” could enact the intrusive 
version); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (same). 
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(emphasis added)—language that would naturally include municipal entities, thus 
limiting States’ power over their subdivisions.  The Supreme Court still rejected that 
interpretation, because the statute’s text was “not limited to one reading” and did not 
“unequivocally” state that it applied to municipalities.  Nixon, 541 U.S. at 141.
6
 
Even more striking, the Election Clause states that certain election rules “shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 
(emphasis added).  Despite that language, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Clause to allow lawmaking by whichever branch States choose to empower—not just the 
legislature—because federalism requires “that States retain autonomy to establish their 
own governmental processes.”  Az. State Legislature v. Az. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015) (holding that a State could empower an independent 
commission to regulate elections).  If the Constitution cannot impose a legislature-only 
rule explicitly, clearly a statute cannot do so implicitly, without any mention of the 
legislature. 
 
                                                 
6
 Where the federalism clear-statement rule applies, it is typically “fatal” to an intrusive 
construction of a statute.  Nixon, 541 U.S. at 141.  Numerous cases demonstrate “the 
Supreme Court’s strong fidelity to the ‘federalism canon.’”  Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 
840 F.3d 618, 625 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended, 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2017); see Will v. 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (collecting cases).  Indeed, the one 
case where this Court has found that a statute satisfied the rule involved a statute that was 
completely “explicit” about its intent to regulate real estate transactions—no other 
construction was possible.  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Sundquist, 2018 UT 58, ¶ 9, 430 P.3d 
623.  And the intrusion there was simply that Congress had regulated interstate commerce 
in an area that States traditionally regulate, not the significantly rarer and more invasive 
step of reordering the States’ internal structure of authority. 
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3. Nothing in the Legislative History Overrides the Plain Meaning of the 
Statute’s Text. 
 
Because the statutory text is clear, this Court need not “resort to legislative 
history.”  Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994); see World Peace Mvmt. 
of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) (same). 
To the extent legislative history is relevant, it confirms that § 1621(d)’s purpose is 
to let States provide benefits if they choose to.  Congress recognized that certain benefits 
would help immigrants achieve PRWORA’s goal of “self-sufficiency,” H.R. Rep. No. 
104-651 (“House Report”), 1996 WL 393655, at *1240 (June 27, 1996); 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1601(1), (3), and so it created a mechanism for States to provide those benefits.  See 
House Report, 1996 WL 393655, at *1445; Finch v. Comm. Health Ins. Connector Auth., 
459 Mass. 655, 673 n.18 (2011) (“Congress is pleased for States” to provide benefits 
where they choose to).  The intrusive reading of § 1621(d) conflicts with that purpose, 
because it would prevent States from providing eligibility using their own lawmaking 
processes.  Nothing in § 1621(d)’s legislative history hints at why Congress would have 
wanted to punish States for having the wrong internal distribution of power. 
A single, unexplained sentence in the legislative history suggests otherwise, but it 
is plainly not a reliable guide for interpreting § 1621(d).  It states that § 1621(d) requires 
“the affirmative enactment of a law [1] by a State legislature [2] and signed by the 
Governor . . . [3] that references this provision.”  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 
(July 30, 1996).  This describes what the text of § 1621(d) requires—“the affirmative 
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enactment of a law”—but then adds three additional requirements that are not in the 
enacted text. 
This errant sentence cannot be used to interpret § 1621(d).  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has instructed courts only to consult pieces of legislative history that “shed a 
reliable light” on the meaning of statutory text.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (emphasis added) (refusing to rely on unreliable 
legislative history); Matter of the Adoption of B.N.A., 2018 UT App. 224, ¶ 19 n.6 
(same).  But a patently inaccurate description of a statute cannot be a reliable indicator of 
its meaning.  The sentence above is inaccurate in multiple respects, because the text of  
§ 1621(d) makes no mention of governors, legislatures, or references to the statute.
7
  
Courts typically do not give weight to such a “snippet of legislative history” that is not 
“anchored in the text of the statute.”  Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994). 
For that reason, the California Supreme Court concluded that the same sentence 
was unreliable and therefore irrelevant to § 1621(d)’s meaning.  See Martinez v. Regents 
of Univ. of Cal., 50 Cal.4th 1277, 1293, 1295-96 (Cal. 2010) (“The committee report may 
not create a requirement not found in section 1621 itself.”).  This Court, too, has 
disregarded legislative history that describes a narrower rule than the enacted text.  See 
Graves v. N.E. Servs., 2015 UT 28, ¶¶ 61, 67, 345 P.3d 619 (refusing to interpret a broad 
                                                 
7
 Giving weight to this isolated sentence would narrow § 1621(d) in multiple untenable 
ways that have no basis in its text.  It would require benefits laws to explicitly cite  
§ 1621(d)—the result rejected in Martinez.  And it would mean that even a state statute 
could not provide eligibility if the governor allowed it to become law without her 
signature, or if the legislature overrode her veto.  See Utah Const. art. VII, § 8. 
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statutory term (“fault”) to have the narrower meaning (“negligence”) stated in the 
legislative history). 
The sentence’s reliability is further eroded by other inaccuracies in the same 
committee report.  The very next paragraph describes a provision that regulates 
“information regarding . . . citizenship and immigration status” only.  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).  
But the committee report says the statute applies to “information regarding the 
immigration status of an alien or the presence, whereabouts, or activities of illegal 
aliens.”  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (emphasis added).  Courts have uniformly 
rejected those additional elements, because they clearly go beyond the enacted text of  
§ 1373.  See, e.g., Steinle v. San Francisco, --- F.3d ---, 2019 WL 1323172, *6 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 25, 2019); United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1101-03 (E.D. Cal. 
2018); Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 331-33 (E.D. Pa. 2018); San 
Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 967-68 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  The committee 
report’s unusual descriptions of § 1373 and § 1621(d) are either simply errors or, more 
troublingly, the kind of “strategic manipulations” that trigger “the worst fears of critics 
who argue legislative history will be used to circumvent the Article I process.”  
Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 568, 570. 
Finally, regardless of the sentence’s reliability, the federalism and constitutional 
avoidance principles discussed above and below trump any contrary legislative history.  
See supra Part I.B.2; infra Part I.C.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, when an 
interpretation would raise “grave doubts” about a federal statute’s constitutionality, 
courts must choose a construction that avoids those doubts even if “the legislative history 
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point[s] somewhat more strongly in another way.”  Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp., 
419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974); see also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48 (explaining that a 
substantive canon trumped “contrary indications in the statute’s legislative history”).  In 
other words, legislative history should not be used to alter the federal-state balance or 
create constitutional problems where the text of the statute does not. 
4. Case Law Provides No Basis to Disregard § 1621(d)’s Plain Meaning. 
Few courts have addressed whether § 1621(d) requires a statute.  The New York 
Appellate Division and Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded it did not, and that state 
courts can therefore make undocumented immigrants eligible for bar admission.  See In 
re Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 11-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); In re Order Amending Rule 202, 
No. 790 (Pa. 2019).
8
  Other courts have mostly addressed whether already-enacted 
statutes satisfied § 1621(d)’s other requirements, like the need to “affirmatively” provide 
eligibility.  See, e.g., De Vries v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 6 Cal. App. 5th 574, 595 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2016).  Because state statutes already existed in those cases, the courts had no 
occasion to consider whether other entities could make the relevant law.  At most, these 
cases assumed that a statute was required, but none of them analyzed the issue, much less 
announced any holding. 
Only one court has concluded that § 1621(d) may require a statute enacted by a 
legislature.  See Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners re Questions as to Whether Undocumented 
Immigrants Are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So.3d 432 (Fla. 2014) 
                                                 
8
 Available at https://bit.ly/2U67QMN.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted this 
rule at the recommendation of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners.  See 48 Pa. 
Bull. 6385, Vol. 48, No. 40 (Oct. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2HUdCdB. 
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(holding that DACA recipients were not eligible for law licenses in Florida).  But even 
there, it was not clear that the Florida Supreme Court reached a final conclusion.  After 
stating why a statute might be necessary, the court noted the petitioners’ argument that 
“non-legislative forms of ‘State law’” could also suffice.  Id. at 435.  The court did not 
reject that possibility, it simply did not find any “existing” law in Florida providing 
benefits, id.—hardly a reason for why a court could not enact such a law. 
In any event, the Florida Supreme Court’s discussion of § 1621(d) omitted almost 
all of the relevant analysis.   The court did not examine the text of § 1621(d) at all—it 
simply asserted, without analysis, that the “plain language” requires a statute.  Id. at 435.  
It did not consider the meaning of “enact” or “law,” consult any dictionaries, compare the 
language to other federal statutes, examine judicial usage, consider the federalism clear-
statement rule, or address the constitutional problems with a legislature-only rule.  Id. at 
435 & n.5.  The court’s incomplete analysis provides little guidance on this question. 
C. Interpreting § 1621(d) to Require State Legislation Would Raise Serious 
Constitutional Concerns. 
 
Constitutional concerns present yet another reason to avoid the intrusive reading 
of § 1621(d).  “[W]hen an Act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its 
constitutionality,” courts must “first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
689 (2001) (quotation marks omitted); see Cole v. Jordan School Dist., 899 P.2d 776, 
778 (Utah 1995).  To avoid such doubts, “every reasonable construction must be resorted 
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. 
20 
 
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quotation 
marks omitted); see Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ¶ 23, 332 P.3d 900. 
1. Section 1621(d) would raise grave constitutional doubts if it dictated who must 
exercise the States’ lawmaking authority.  Congress cannot issue commands to the 
governments of the States, including commands about how to allocate their authority.  It 
can only regulate private actors directly—something a legislature-only rule would not do.  
Section 1621(d) therefore cannot require Utah to exercise its public-benefits authority 
through a federally-chosen branch of its government.  Accord Vargas, 131 A.D.3d at 11-
12 (rejecting statute-only interpretation on constitutional grounds); id. at 9 n.9 (noting 
that other courts have not addressed this constitutional question). 
The Constitution reflects a “fundamental structural decision” to give Congress 
“the power to regulate individuals, not States.”  Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475-
76 (2018) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).  Congress can 
therefore “exercise its legislative authority directly over [private] individuals,” but it can 
never “issue direct orders to the governments of the States.”  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 
(quotation marks omitted).  This prohibition on direct orders applies “categorically.”  
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997).  Indeed, “even a particularly strong 
federal interest” would not allow Congress to dictate how States exercise their lawmaking 
authority.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 178). 
This rule prohibits direct orders of all kinds.  Congress cannot order state 
governments to enact a law, see New York, 505 U.S. at 174-80, or refrain from enacting a 
law, see Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478, or accept federal funds, see NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 
21 
 
U.S. 519, 587 (2012), or administer a federal program, see Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-33.  
Nor can Congress dictate where a State chooses to locate its capitol, because that is “a 
matter pertaining purely to the internal policy of the state.”  Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 
565, 579 (1911); see also Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 260 
(2011) (recognizing “limits on the Federal Government’s power to affect the internal 
operations of a State”). 
Likewise, Congress cannot “displace a State’s allocation of governmental power 
and responsibility” between the branches of its government.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 752 (1999).  This, too, is a purely internal matter, and one that is fundamental to a 
State’s sovereignty.  See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (A “State defines itself as a sovereign” 
through “the structure of its government.”).  Thus, in its sovereign immunity cases, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has explained that subjecting an unwilling State to lawsuits would 
shift spending decisions from the State’s political branches to its courts—something the 
Constitution’s federal structure forbids.  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 751-52.  In other words, 
because “[a] State is entitled to order the processes of its own governance” free from 
federal interference, Congress cannot alter a State’s decision to “assign[]” a particular 
policy decision “to the political branches, rather than the courts.”  Id.; see also Stewart, 
563 U.S. at 265 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (doubting that Congress could demand “far-




                                                 
9
 These principles are not limited to the sovereign immunity context, but rather “inhere[] 
in the system of federalism established by the Constitution.”  Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.  
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The same is true here.  If Congress cannot restructure state governments indirectly, 
by abrogating sovereign immunity, surely it cannot restructure them directly, by spelling 
out exactly which branch must regulate a given area.  The Constitution simply does not 
allow that kind of “federally-imposed restructuring of power within state government.”  
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 870 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (striking down 
federal statute); see also Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[S]tate 
sovereignty . . . surely encompasses the right to set the duties of office for state-created 
officials.”). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has protected the States’ fundamental prerogative to 
structure their governments in a variety of contexts.  For instance, as mentioned above, 
the Election Clause states that certain election laws “shall be prescribed in each State by 
the Legislature thereof.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  The Court has nonetheless held 
that States can choose which state entity should exercise that power.  Az. State 
Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2673.  As the Court explained, “it is characteristic of our federal 
system that States retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes,” 
including which “component of state government [is] authorized to prescribe regulations” 
on a given subject.  Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Indeed, the principles that protect state sovereign immunity often also protect state 
autonomy more broadly.  See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61 (holding that federalism 
clear-statement rule applies to both Tenth and Eleventh Amendments); Will v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (same).  And as explained in the text, courts 
have protected States’ prerogative to structure their own governments in multiple 




Thus, Murphy, Alden, Arizona Redistricting Commission, and their antecedents 
add up to the same core principle:  Congress cannot issue direct orders to state 
governments, including orders dictating which branch of government must exercise a 
particular piece of the State’s lawmaking authority.  That principle forecloses any 
interpretation of § 1621(d) that would require state legislatures to exercise States’ 
authority over public benefits.  “A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to 
imagine.”  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478. 
2.  In other litigation after Murphy, the United States has advanced several 
arguments to salvage other statutes that “issue direct orders to the governments of the 
States.”  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a), (b) (ordering States 
not to enact certain laws).  Every court to consider these arguments has rejected them.  
See San Francisco, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 949-953; Philadelphia, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 329-30; 
Chicago, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 868-73.  This Court should too. 
First, the United States may argue that a legislature-only rule would be a “valid 
preemption provision,” because the federal benefits scheme regulates private actors.  
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.  That is wrong.  As explained above, Congress can regulate 
private actors directly, but not state governments.  Thus, to be valid, every rule Congress 
enacts must “operate[]” as one that “imposes restrictions or confers rights on private 
actors.”  Id. at 1480; see id. at 1480-81 (giving examples).  Even if that description 
applied to § 1621’s underlying eligibility rules, it plainly would not apply to a command 
that States exercise their public-benefits authority through their legislatures.  That rule 
would not confer any right or impose any restriction on private actors—it would simply 
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govern how state governments make their own regulatory decisions.  In short, “there is 
simply no way to understand” such a rule “as anything other than a direct command to 
the States.”  Id. at 1481.
10
 
In other cases, the United States has argued that direct orders to the States are 
permissible as long as they are connected to a broader federal scheme like the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  But there is no such exception to the 
Constitution’s “fundamental structural decision . . . to withhold from Congress the power 
to issue orders directly to the States.”  Id. at 1475.  Multiple cases make this clear.  In 
Printz, the broader federal Brady Act scheme regulated private parties’ handgun 
purchases, 521 U.S. at 902-03, but the Supreme Court still invalidated the specific rule 
that dictated how state officers had to participate in that scheme.  The same was true in 
NFIB, where Congress had enacted an extensive federal scheme regulating private health 
insurance, but the Court struck down the specific rule that constituted a direct order to the 
States.  The “same principles” applied in Murphy and apply here.  138 S. Ct. at 1477; see 
also Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 644 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying anti-
commandeering principles in the immigration context). 
                                                 
10
 That kind of direct order goes far beyond the rules in Gregory and Nixon, which the 
Court assumed Congress could have imposed with an explicit statement.  In those cases, 
the intrusive version of the rule would have applied across the board, to state actors and 
private actors alike.  The Constitution allows those kinds of generally-applicable laws.  
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (anti-commandeering does not prevent federal laws that 
“appl[y] equally to state and private actors”); see, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Congress may apply FLSA to state employees).  
Here, by contrast, a legislature-only rule would target the States alone.  See Printz, 521 




Second, the United States may argue that Congress can order the States to provide 
public benefits through their legislatures because Congress could have instead preempted 
States from providing those benefits.  But the fact that Congress did not preempt certain 
state laws does not give Congress the power to dictate which state entity enacts them.  
Notably, when Murphy listed the ways that Congress can validly influence state 
policymaking, it did not mention any congressional power to force States to enact laws a 
certain way simply because Congress chose not to preempt those laws. 138 S. Ct. at 
1478-79. 
Such a power would have remarkable consequences, because it would mean 
Congress could forcibly alter the internal operations of state governments in any realm 
where a federal regulatory scheme exists.  Congress could require States to enact certain 
healthcare laws by initiative only, because Congress could have preempted those laws 
instead.  See 42 U.S.C. ch. 157 (federal healthcare laws).  Or Congress could require 
legislative supermajorities for state laws that affect greenhouse gas emissions.  See 42 
U.S.C. ch. 134 (federal energy laws).  Or it could require that governors, not state 
administrative agencies, issue licenses for businesses engaged in interstate commerce.  
See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1) (preempting certain state regulations of interstate 
commerce).  The United States’ theory would mark a vast expansion of congressional 
power over state governments. 
The United States has elsewhere tried to bolster this argument by suggesting that 
ambiguous language in FERC v. Mississippi establishes that Congress can issue 
commands in any “field” that is “pre-emptible.”  456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982).  It is unclear 
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what the government’s suggested rule would actually mean, because by definition, every 
“field” in which Congress can legislate is “pre-emptible.”  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 
(legislative power); id. art. VI, § 2 (preemption).  In any event, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has already rejected any such reading.  In New York, the Court struck down a federal 
command in the field of radioactive waste, even though “Congress could, if it wished, 
pre-empt state radioactive waste regulation” altogether.  505 U.S. at 160.  The Court 
rejected Justice White’s attempt to read FERC broadly, id. at 204, explaining that “even 
where Congress has the authority” to preempt state law, “it lacks the power directly to 
compel the States” to regulate according to federal instructions, id. at 166.  And in 
Murphy, the Court counseled against reading FERC beyond its facts.  It explained that the 
statute in FERC was constitutional because it merely asked States “to consider 
Congress’s preference,” and it emphasized that “FERC was decided well before our 






                                                 
11
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Hodel is inapposite for the same reason.  There, 
“Congress enacted a statute that comprehensively regulated surface coal mining and 
offered States” the option of enforcing the federal regime.  Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.  
Here, in contrast, a statute-only rule would dictate how States exercise their own 
authority to provide benefits using their own funds.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (regulating 
“State and local public benefits” only); id. § 1621(c) (defining benefits as those provided 
“by appropriated funds of a State”).  Unlike in Hodel, § 1621(d) does not regulate States’ 
participation in the federal benefits scheme—a different statute governs those.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1611 (regulating benefits provided “by appropriated funds of the United States,” 
many of which are disbursed by the States). 
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II. Qualified Bar Applicants Should Be Eligible to Practice Law Regardless of 
Immigration Status. 
 
The Court should enact the law described in § 1621(d) and provide that 
immigrants are eligible for law licenses if they meet the normal criteria for bar admission.  
As many States have concluded, there is no “rational basis for withholding the privilege 
of practicing law” from immigrants like the petitioners in this case.  Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 
at 12, 27-28; see also Pet. Br. 7-12 (describing such laws enacted by courts and 
legislatures in New York, Pennsylvania, California, Florida, Illinois Nebraska, Wyoming, 
and New Jersey).  The Utah State Bar has come to the same conclusion, and has 
petitioned this Court to enact the same rule.  See In re Utah State Bar, Case No. 
20160318-SC.  It would be appropriate for this Court to do so for at least five reasons. 
First, in every relevant way, the petitioners are in the same position as other 
applicants who successfully apply for admission to the Utah State Bar.  They have lived 
virtually their entire lives in the United States, they have excelled in law school and 
received law degrees, they are already members in good standing of another State’s bar, 
and they have been working productively as lawyers for multiple years.  The petitioners 
are no different from any other successful bar applicant in Utah.  Their applications 






Second, the petitioners’ immigration status does not reflect negatively on their 
moral character.  Just like U.S.-born children, they know no other country as their home.  
They have built deeply rooted and productive lives here, and their families, communities, 
and careers are in Utah.  They have committed no crime in doing so, because “it is not a 
crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States.”  Arizona v. United 
States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012).  And in any event, past violations of the law typically 
do not result in any categorical prohibition against bar admission, especially when an 
applicant’s subsequent achievements demonstrate good moral character.  See, e.g., 
Garcia, 58 Cal.4th at 460 (explaining that the “bare fact” of an illegal act does not 
prevent bar admission) (quotation marks omitted). 
Third, the United States itself has determined that the petitioners should be able to 
live and work in the United States.  The petitioners have been granted protection under 
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which required them to 
show that they had a clean record and were pursuing their education diligently.  The 
program is premised on the federal government’s belief that “the United States’ 
immigration laws were not designed ‘to remove productive young people to countries 
where they may not have lived or even speak the language.’”  Vargas, 131 A.D.3d at 15 
(quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, at 2 (June 15, 
2012)). 
Fourth, the petitioners are equipped to put their Utah law licenses to good use.  As 
DACA recipients, they have received authorization from the federal government to seek 
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employment in Utah and anywhere else in the United States.
12
  See 8 C.F.R.  
§ 274a.12(c)(14).  They would accordingly have the same options to practice law as any 
other barred attorney in Utah. 
There is no reason, however, to limit the eligibility rule to DACA recipients, 
because even without DACA protections, an undocumented immigrant can still put a law 
license to productive use in multiple ways.  First, there are numerous other ways to obtain 
employment authorization, such as when asylum or other proceedings are pending.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10)-(13); id. § 274a.12(c)(8)-(11), (14), (18)-(20), (22), (24).  
Second, there are many ways a person without employment authorization can 
productively use a law license.  For instance, an attorney without employment 
authorization can “provide[] legal services on a pro bono basis or outside the United 
States.”  Garcia, 58 Cal.4th at 462 (noting the United States’ agreement).  That is why 
Utah law allows foreign law students to obtain law licenses despite their lack of 
employment authorization in the United States.  See Utah Court Admission Rule 14-
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 DACA has been in effect continuously since 2012.  In November 2017, DHS issued a 
memorandum stating its intention to gradually rescind the program.  But multiple courts 
have enjoined the rescission nationwide, holding that DHS’s rescission decision was 
legally and procedurally improper.  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 279 F. Supp. 
3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. 
Supp. 3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018).  The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether to grant review.  See Robert 
Barnes, DACA Program Not Likely to Get Supreme Court Review This Term, Wash. Post 
(Jan. 22, 2019).  At the same time, Congress is considering bills that would grant DACA 
recipients permanent legal status.  See Nicole Acevedo, House Democrats Introduce Bill 
to Give Citizenship to DACA and TPS Recipients, NBC News (Mar. 12, 2019).  For 
present purposes, all that matters is that the Petitioners currently have both DACA 
protection and employment authorization.  The Court need not make any predictions 
about how other litigation and legislation may change things in the future. 
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704(d).  Undocumented immigrants can also work as independent contractors without 
violating the federal prohibition on unauthorized “employment.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a; see 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.1(f)-(h) (prohibition does not reach “independent contractors”).  
Immigrants without DACA protection or employment authorization are thus perfectly 
capable of using law licenses productively.  See Garcia, 58 Cal.4th at 463 n.18 (granting 




Fifth, admitting the petitioners to the Utah Bar would serve the important goal of 
allowing immigrants to be self-sufficient and serve their communities.  In the same 
statutory scheme as § 1621(d), Congress declared that our “national policy” is to 
encourage immigrants to achieve “[s]elf-sufficiency” and “rely on their own capabilities” 
rather than public assistance.  8 U.S.C. § 1601(1), (2)(A).  The Petitioners are seeking 
precisely that, and are asking this Court for permission to support themselves and their 
families through their own work.  There is no reason to prevent otherwise-eligible 
immigrants from being admitted to the Utah Bar. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Court should grant the petition and provide that undocumented immigrants 




                                                 
13
 See also Br. of Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., In re Garcia, No. S202512, at 18-25 
(Cal. filed July 27, 2012) (explaining ways a person without employment authorization 
can still work as a lawyer), https://bit.ly/2UYUnn2. 
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